Maintaining an economically sensible trade policy is often a matter of managing pressures for exceptions -for protection for a particular industry. Good policy becomes a matter of managing interventions so as to strengthen the politics of openness and liberalization -of avoiding rather than of imposing such restrictions in the future. In the 1990s, antidumping measures emerged as the instrument of choice to accomplish this, despite the fact that they satisfy neither of these criteria. Its economics is ordinary protection; it considers the impact on the domestic interests that will benefit while excluding the domestic interests that will bear the costs. Its unfair trade rhetoric undercuts rather than supports a policy of openness. As to what would be better, the key issue in a domestic policy decision should be the impact on the domestic economy. Antidumping reform depends less on the good will of WTO delegates toward the "public interest" than on those business interests that are currently treated by trade law as bastards insisting that they be given the same standing as the law now recognizes for protection seekers.
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Summary
Maintaining an economically sensible trade policy is often a matter of managing pressures for exceptions -for protection for a particular industry. In the early years of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the most used mechanism for making such adjustments was renegotiation, supplemented by emergency actions under GATT Article XIX.
By the early 1980s these instruments had given way to negotiated or "voluntary" export restraints (VERs), in the 1990s antidumping emerged as the instrument of choice. This evolution shifted the focal point for the decision from international negotiations to a domestic administrative process. It also shifted the source of discipline from reciprocity to rules -the specification in domestic regulations and in the WTO agreement on antidumping as to when action could be taken.
These shifts have brought with them a burgeoning of usage -almost 2,500 antidumping cases by WTO members since the Uruguay Round agreements went into effect (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . This is a ten-fold increase in the number (per year) of increases of protection beyond limits bound at the WTO.
Proposals on antidumping submitted at the Doha Negotiations reflect thinking within the box. Members who would like to see fewer antidumping measures propose to tweak the existing structure of rules in one direction, other Members prefer clarifications that would allow them to hold the line. This struggle over technicalities, we contend, will have no impact on the quality or the quantity of import restrictions applied. There are sufficient technicalities that any national authority of a mind to reach an affirmative determination can make a case. A mathematician would say that the system is overdetermined; e.g., we have 15 equations to solve for two unknowns. Any two equations are sufficient for a solution, choosing the "right" equations provides considerable flexibility in what appears to be a technical system. Adding a few technicalities here, trimming a few there, will have no impact.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards did eliminate the use of VERs. It provides a mechanism that avoids accusations of unfair trade and imposes stricter limits on protectionist measures than does the antidumping agreement. The instrument however is hardly ever used, 142 safeguard vs. 2,416 antidumping cases. The antidumping agreement provides less iii restraint on protectionist measures that can be imposed, its coverage -what falls within the legal specification of when protection can be imposed -is as broad as that of the safeguard agreement.
The instruments are fungible, the worse policy instrument drives out the better.
Several proposals suggest that the "public interest" be taken into account. The "public interest" however is treated as something ethereal, other-worldly, a socialist will-of-the-wisp that the government must represent. The relevant concept of interest, we suggest, is the sum of all the private interests affected. Only if there are "externalities" -and such are infrequently present when import protection is sought -is there an unidentified remainder that requires public representation.
Moreover, this bad economics presumes that the "public interest" would be defended by limiting the restriction to no more than is necessary to eliminate the impact of import competition on the protection seeker. Defending the "public interest" thus means to treat other private interests, user interests, as bastard children. They are served after the "legitimate" protection seeker has everything he wants.
As to how international rules might shape domestic processes through which governments take decisions to impose protection, one might hope that they would guide a country to identify those interventions that add more to the national economic interest than they take away. There will be cases however in which other domestic considerations make it impossible to avoid an economically unsound trade intervention. In those instances, good policy becomes a matter of managing interventions so as to strengthen the politics of openness and liberalization -of avoiding rather than of imposing such restrictions in the future.
Antidumping satisfies neither of these criteria. Its economics is ordinary protection, it considers the impact on the domestic interests that will benefit, it excludes the domestic interests that will bear the costs. Its unfair trade rhetoric undercuts rather than supports a policy of openness.
As to what would be better, the key issue in a domestic policy decision should be the impact on the domestic economy. Who in the domestic economy would benefit from the proposed import restriction, and who would lose? By how much? Such a policy mechanism would both (a) help the government to separate trade interventions that would serve the national iv economic interest from those that would not, and (b) even in those instances in which the decision is to restrict imports, support the politics of openness and liberalization.
The technicalities are simple: recognize domestic users/consumers as "interested parties;" require that the investigation determine the impact on them of the proposed restriction in parallel with its determination of "injury" from trade to the protection seeker. The impact of the restriction on users/consumers would be measured in the same dimensions as injury -jobs lost because of higher costs, lower profits -the standard metric of impact. In short, treat all affected domestic interests as equals. Until this is done, buyers will be left to bring forward their interests in such unofficial ways as threatening to boycott any domestic producer who supports an antidumping petition.
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Our focus here is on the basic concepts and principles. In our analysis we accept the reality that governments musts have tools with which they can manage pressures for protection, e.g., an escape valve. Our conclusion goes beyond the familiar conclusion that these instruments do not make economic sense. They do not make managerial sense, either. In this paper we will draw on GATT's history and on elementary economics to identify possible political and economic rationales for such instruments. We review usage, particularly since the Uruguay Round Agreements came into effect in 1995, then evaluate proposals for reform that have been tabled in the ongoing Doha negotiations.
GATT Origins of Escape Valves
Any government that maintains a liberal trade policy will be subject to occasional pressures for exceptional treatment, e.g., temporary protection for a particular industry. Thus part of the politics of safeguarding a generally liberal trade policy is to have in place a mechanism to manage such pressures -to help the government to isolate and to contain a special interest pressure that might otherwise undermine a broad liberalization effort.
Renegotiation
As reciprocal negotiation was the initial GATT mode for removing trade restrictions, it is no surprise that renegotiation was the most prominent provision for re-imposing them. The early GATT rounds were collections of bilateral negotiations, but tariff cuts had to be made on a most favored idea of compensation was the same here as with a renegotiation, to provide on some other product a reduction that suppliers considered equally valuable.
In the 1950's the GATT was amended to add more elaborate renegotiation provisions.
Though the details were complex, the renegotiation process, in outline, was straightforward.
1. A country for which import of some product had become particularly troublesome would advise the GATT and the principal exporters of that product that it wanted to renegotiate its previous tariff reduction.
2. If, after a certain number of days, negotiation had not reached agreement, the country could go ahead and increase the tariff.
3. If the initiating country did so -and at the same time did not provide compensation that exporters considered satisfactory -then the principal exporters were free to retaliate.
4. All of these actions were subject to the most favored nations principle; the tariff reductions or increases had to apply to imports from all countries.
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Emergency actions
Article XIX, titled "Emergency Actions on Imports of Particular Products," but often referred to as the escape clause or the safeguard clause, provided a country with an import problem quicker access to essentially the same process. Under Article XIX:
1. If imports cause or threaten serious injury 3 to domestic producers, the country could take emergency action to restrict those imports.
2. If subsequent consultation with exporters did not lead to satisfactory compensation, then the exporters could retaliate.
The GATT asked the country taking emergency action to consult with exporting countries before, but allowed the action to come first in "critical circumstances." In practice, the action has come first most of the time. 
Negotiated Export Restraints
By the 1960s formal use of Article XIX and of the renegotiations process began to wane.
Actions taken under the escape clause tended to involve negligible amounts of world trade in relatively minor product categories. 5 Big problems such as textile and apparel imports were handled another way, through the negotiation of "voluntary" export restraint agreements, VERs.
The various textile agreements beginning in 1962, provided GATT sanction to VERs on textiles and apparel. The same method, negotiated export restraints, or VERs, were used by the developed economies to control troublesome imports into several other important sectors, e.g., steel in the US, autos in the EU. 4 GATT 1994, p. 486. The Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement modified the emergency action procedure in several ways. Among these, • no compensation is required nor retaliation allowed in the first three years a restriction is in place.
• no restriction (including extension) may be for more than eight years, (ten years by a developing country).
• all measures of more than 1 year must be progressively liberalized. 5 1980 statistics show that actions taken under Article XIX covered imports valued at $1.6 billion while total world trade was at the same time valued at $2000 billion. Sampson (1987), p. 145. Except for those specially sanctioned by the textile arrangements, VERs were clearly However, while VERs violated GATT legalisms they accorded well with its ethic of reciprocity:
• They were at least in form, negotiations to allow imposition of restrictions. Negotiation was also important to prevent a chain reaction of one country following another to restrict its imports as had occurred in the 1930s.
• The quid pro quo might be outside the ambit of GATT's coverage; e.g., foreign aid or some political consideration.
• The domestic politics was less troublesome. In the exporting economy the compensationhigher prices -came to the companies whose sales were restricted, not to another sector. In the importing economy, forcing users to pay higher prices is easier politics than reducing import restrictions that protect other industries.
• In many instances the troublesome increase of imports came from countries that had not been the "principal suppliers" with whom the initial concession had been negotiated. These new exporters were displacing not only domestic production in importing countries, but the exports of the traditional suppliers as well. A VER with the new, troublesome, supplier could thus be viewed as defense of the rights of the principal suppliers who had paid for the initial concession.
• The reality of power politics was another factor. Even though one of GATT's objectives was to neutralize the influence of economic power on the determination of trade policy, VERs were frequently used by large countries to control imports from smaller countries.
As the renegotiation -emergency action mechanism was replaced over time by the use of VERs, VERs also gave way to another mechanism --antidumping. There were several reasons behind this evolution:
• the growing realization in developed economies that a VER was a costly form of protection, 7
• the long term legal pressure of the GATT rules,
• the availability of an attractive, GATT-legal, alternative.
The Uruguay Round agreement on safeguards explicitly bans further use of VERs and, along with the agreement on textiles and clothing, requires the elimination of all such measures now in place.
Antidumping
Antidumping was a minor instrument when GATT was negotiated, and provision for antidumping regulations was included with little controversy. In 1958, when the contracting parties finally canvassed themselves about the use of antidumping, the resulting tally showed only 37 antidumping decrees in force across all GATT member countries, 21 of these in South Africa. (GATT 1958, p. 14 Once antidumping proved itself to be applicable to any case of troublesome imports, its other attractions for protection seeking industries and for governments inclined to provide protection were apparent.
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• Particular exporters could be picked out. GATT/WTO does not require multilateral application.
• The action is unilateral. GATT/WTO rules require no compensation or renegotiation.
• In national practice, the injury test for antidumping action tends to be softer than the injury test for action under Article XIX.
• The rhetoric of foreign unfairness provides a vehicle for building a political case for protection.
• Antidumping and VERs have proved to be effective complements; i.e., the threat of formal action under the antidumping law provides leverage to force an exporter to accept a VER. 8 The process by which the scope of antidumping was expanded is examined in ch. 2. 9 Over 1980-1988, 348 of 774 United States antidumping cases were superseded by VERs (Finger and Murray, 1993) . July 1980 through June 1989, of 384 antidumping actions taken by the European Community, 184 were price undertakings. (Stegmann, 1992 ).
• The investigation process itself tends to curb imports. This is because exporters bear significant legal and administrative costs, importers face the uncertainty of having to pay backdated antidumping duties, once an investigation is completed.
• There is no rule against double jeopardy. If one petition against an exporter fails, minor respecification generates a new valid petition. Even so, the WTO negotiations continue to take up antidumping as if it were a specialized instrument.
Lessons from this history
A second lesson is that the source of discipline over use of such escape clause instruments has shifted, from reciprocity to legal obligation. A renegotiation is based on the same give-take as a negotiation. An antidumping action is an exercise of a reserved right to impose a restriction, the limit on use of this right is the detail of the agreement that acknowledges the right.
Rationales for GATT/WTO Rules
The objective, we postulate, is to advance the national economic interest, which we take to be the sum of the private interests affected. This is simple economics. Only if there are 10 Tarullo, p. 373. Emphasis added. 11 Horlick and Shea, p. 206 "externalities" -costs or benefits to private domestic parties not captured in the transaction price -will the formula be incorrect. As we will explain, such "externalities" are infrequently encountered in situations in which import protection is sought.
Economic science generally finds that an import restriction will reduce the national economic interest of the country that imposes it. The protected domestic interests will be better off, but the costs to other domestic interests will be larger. Because certain interests have more influence in politics than they have value in economics, the domestic political process will sometimes choose import protection even when it does not serve the national economic interest.
Hence the usefulness of introducing international obligations into the making of national trade policy. Reciprocal negotiations or international rules in such instances can help to offset the deficit between the economic correctness and the political correctness of national openness to international trade.
We identify the following possible rationales for rules that allow import restrictions.
Good import restrictions rather than bad.
One justification for such rules might be that they guide Members toward good policiespolicies that advance the national economic interest of the Members that apply them.
GATT/WTO rules might identify import restrictions that make economic sense. While "ordinary protection" is bad economics, these rules might identify the exceptional cases; those conditions in which an import restriction helps domestic producers more than it costs domestic users/consumers of the product.
Import restrictions as an incentive against bad policy in exporting countries.
The allowed 12 import restrictions might provide an incentive against bad policies or practices in the exporting country, policies that reduce the national economic interest there. Jan
Tumlir, once Chief Economist in the GATT Secretariat, often argued that without the stringent United States law that almost automatically imposed countervailing duties, European governments after WWII would have resorted to extensive subsidization and thereby set back the recovery of European industry.
12 The GATT/WTO is an expression of the limits members have accepted on their sovereign right to regulate their own trade, not of the "permission" a superior authority has extended. We use the word "allows" in this sense.
An escape valve, an instrument to control domestic pressures for protection.
The allowed restrictions might be a management tool, an escape valve for the government to accommodate and at the same time isolate powerful interests that might otherwise set back an entire liberalization program. They allow one step back to protect two steps forward, help to defend a general program of liberalization. Governments that attempt to move toward liberal trade policies will come under pressure from one industry or another for exceptional treatment.
This is a political reality; there should therefore be policy mechanisms to manage such pressures.
The good of such mechanisms is the extent to which they help to even out the politics of protection -to bring forward the case for unrestrained trade even as they allow temporary restraints.
A related justification is that safeguards are an uncalibrated compromise with protectionist interests. They are the promise that liberalization would be drawn back where it significantly disrupted domestic production, the hope that the possibility of one step backward would buy two steps forward.
Less import restrictions rather than more.
The simplest rationale for such WTO rules is that they introduce administrative complexities that might discourage some protection-seekers, or provide "due process" that will placate protection seekers who are turned down. There is no qualitative dimension here, simply "less" import restrictions rather than "more." As import restrictions are usually bad economics, fewer of them will usually be good economics.
The Instruments versus the Rationales
The popular rhetoric of antidumping is that it is an extension of anti-trust policy. It disciplines against predatory pricing by exporters that would in time drive local producers out of business, leaving the exporters with monopoly power. Buyers would benefit from the initial low prices but over the long run they would lose more from the high prices the exporters would ultimately charge. By this rationale, antidumping would identify good import restrictions, ones that would provide a net addition to the national economic interest.
Antidumping and anti-trust
In fact, antidumping has never functioned as an anti-trust instrument. The US Congress did enact in 1916 an antidumping law that paralleled anti-trust law, but protection seekers were not satisfied. Their complaints -the conditions that they insisted justified relief -did not meet the conditions anti-trust law lays down. This failure to supply protection soon brought pressure in the United States for a "Canadian-style" antidumping law that provided an administrative rather than a legal remedy. 14 A growing body of information indicates that antidumping law is more about extending anti-competitive behavior at home than about resisting such behavior from abroad. Messerlin (1990) presented evidence that the European chemicals industry in the 1980s used the antidumping law to support an European cartel. Hindley and Messerlin (1996) carried this analysis farther and found that in several industries use of antidumping against competitors had become a normal part of business strategy. Kelly and Morkre (2002, 8-9) review additional evidence that firms use antidumping to create or support collusive arrangements. They cite several cases, including one involving US and the EU ferrosilicone producers who used the antidumping law to protect an established cartel from competition from the outside.
In sum, antidumping is more about protecting unfair business practices at home than it is about isolating unfair business practices abroad.
The new rhetoric of antidumping
The evidence that antidumping is not an instrument of anti-trust enforcement is so accepted that protection seekers who use this instrument have adopted a new rhetoric. They now defend antidumping as protection from:
• Sanctuary pricing; protection against foreign producers whose home market is a highly protected cash cow and can afford to set lower prices in export markets;
• Pricing below cost; protection against producers whose government support allows them to price below cost.
Several points can be made in reply to this new rationale. First, these are not conditions in which an import restriction would advance the national economic interest. This is thus a new rhetoric for the old case, ordinary protection. Petitioners are still asking more from the rest of the economy than they will deliver to it.
The sanctuary pricing argument for antidumping is also a presumption of rights that the GATT/WTO agreements do not provide. A high tariff, in the GATT/WTO system, is something to be negotiated down. It is not something that provides other Members a unilateral right to raise their protection to the same level. "Tariff peaks," operationally the same thing as "sanctuary pricing" are part of the agenda for the market access negotiations.
Another criticism is that an antidumping investigation does not even factually establish that export price is below home market price or below cost. The surge of antidumping usage from the 1980s brought forward a wave of legal and economic analysis of antidumping methodology that identified many procedural quirks that create a fiction of dumping. 15 For example, in determining home market price, sales at prices judged to be below cost are excluded from evidence, even if exports are sold at the same price. Furthermore, cost estimates are often much higher than those that common sense accounting practices would generate.
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15 In structure, an antidumping law prescribes the conditions under which antidumping action may be taken, the law is not proscribed by any conceptual definition of "dumping." "Dumping" is whatever you can get the government to act against under the antidumping law. 16 Boltuck and Litan (1991) provide many examples from 1980s experience. Lindsey (1999) , Lindsey and Ikenson (2002) have done extensive analysis of US cases from the 1990s.
Antidumping is ordinary protection. Viewed from the perspective of the actions that antidumping seeks to discipline, it prohibits normal business practice -when this prohibition serves the interests of companies with sufficient political influence to call on the government for this advantage. Antidumping is unfair competition, not a defense against it.
Antidumping provides a vehicle for managing pressures for protection, but it promotes a rhetoric of foreign unfairness that overstates the benefits from protection and does nothing to call attention to the costs. As we explain below, there are better policy management tools.
National Welfare and the "Fairness" of Foreign Prices
Part of the rhetoric of antidumping and countervailing duty protection is that because foreign prices do not represent the true economic cost of production, these imports should be restrained. Attractive as this argument is, it is incorrect. Except in the instance discussed above, where low prices are an instrument of predation, the national economic interest of the importing country will be compromised by such restraints. Gains from trade for Country A derive from differences of relative costs in Country A from relative prices in world markets. In GATT/WTO discussions this is an unfamiliar point, in development economics it is a familiar one. A lesson critical for countries who used trade as a vehicle for development was that observable world prices, not almost-impossible-to-calculate "shadow prices" 17 are the relevant measure of alternatives. "For the individual country, world prices are the pivot on which all scarcities turn." (Bell 1987, 824 ) Among developing economies, the "traders" moved ahead, the "planners" who attempted to project what costs really were or would be in the future (the shadow prices) lagged behind.
Countervailing measures as discipline against trade subsidies
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides broad proscriptions against trade subsidies. Generally, these proscriptions make economic sense.
The proscribed trade subsidies generally cost some parts of the economy more than they benefit the sectors that receive them, unilaterally eliminating them makes economic sense. Like import restrictions, such subsidies exist because some interests have more influence in politics than they have value in economics. Again, bringing in international rules can help to undo the imbalance. 17 In GATT-speak, the parallel idea is "normal value."
WTO requirements on notification of subsidies and the normal dispute settlement process for dealing with prohibited measures provide one means for disciplining the use of trade subsidies. The subsidies, countervailing measures agreement also specifies when and how a Member can apply a countervailing measure to imports that have received a subsidy. The two parts of the agreement are consistent; subsidies that may be countervailed are prohibited.
Within the GATT/WTO system a valid rationale for countervailing measures is that they complement the discipline the dispute settlement process provides. They provide additional disincentive for exporting countries to apply trade subsidies. To the extent that the threat has impact -less trade subsidies and less countervailing measures are the result -their benefit for exporting countries is greater and their cost to importing countries is smaller.
Countervailing measures and antidumping do not belong in the same analytical category
Countervailing measures and antidumping have served different functions in the GATT/WTO system. Provisions for countervailing measures are part of the support mechanism the system provides to help governments to avoid trade subsidies. Trade subsidies are bad economics, to the extent that the threat of countervailing measures helps to discipline their use, the threat is a good thing. Moreover, countervailing measures are infrequently used: 168 cases since the Uruguay Round as compared with almost 2500 antidumping cases. There may be instances in which such measures are misused, but used as they are intended the result is good economics. Antidumping, except in the rare case of predation, is bad economics.
Safeguards
During the Uruguay Round negotiators refined and elaborated the provisions of GATT Article XIX "Emergency Measures" in the WTO "Agreement on Safeguards." 18 The objective of the negotiations was to eliminate use of gray area measures such as VERs and to make actions under Article XIX a more attractive alternative. Antidumping is rhetorically about unfair and injurious imports (includes investigations of dumping and of injury) whereas safeguards provide 18 We follow the WTO convention in using the word "safeguards" to refer to actions that draw their legal cover from GATT Article XIX and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Given that the instruments we review in this paper are fungible, the legal distinctions overstate the functional distinctions. It might be useful to distinguish between "safeguards" (with a small "s") and "Safeguards" (with a capital "S"). 
A Sensible Safeguard Mechanism
In practice, maintaining an economically sensible trade policy is often a matter of avoiding interventions that have greater costs than benefits -or when the realities of domestic politics are taken into account -a matter of minimizing the number or the effect of such interventions.
There will be cases in which other domestic considerations make it impossible to avoid an economically unsound trade intervention. In those instances, good policy becomes a matter of:
• making restrictions transparent;
• avoiding their becoming precedent for further restrictions; and,
• managing them so as to strengthen the politics of avoiding rather than of imposing such restrictions in the future.
The key issue in a domestic policy decision should be the impact on the local economy.
Who in the local economy would benefit from the proposed import restriction, and who would lose? By how much? It is therefore critical that the policy process by which the government decides to intervene or not to intervene gives voice to those interests that benefit from open trade and would bear the costs of the proposed intervention.
Such a policy mechanism would both (a) help the government to separate trade interventions that would serve the national economic interest from those that would not, and (b) even in those instances in which the decision is to restrict imports, support the politics of openness and liberalization.
Antidumping fails to satisfy either criteria. As economics, it looks at only half of the economic impact on the domestic economy. It gives standing to import competing domestic interests, but not to domestic users, be they user enterprises or consumers. As politics, it undercuts rather than supports a policy of openness; by giving voice to only the negative impact of trade on domestic interests and by inviting such interests to blame their problems on the "unfairness" of foreigners.
Safeguards as presently constituted likewise satisfy neither criterion. It does not give standing to users, it does nothing to support the politics of openness. Relative to antidumping, it does avoid the anti-openness politics of labeling imports as unfair.
Reform Proposals
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The subsidies, countervailing measures negotiations have more or less the same terms of reference as the antidumping negotiations. Fisheries subsidies will be on the table, environmental interests and economic analysis both suggest removal of such subsidies.
The tendency in negotiations to defend one's own policies without regard to their economic impact is particularly dangerous here. To point out that the agriculture agreement, for example, allows developed economies to maintain larger subsidies than developing economies is a mercantilist debating point; it is not sound policy advice for developing economies.
Antidumping is the larger problem -worse economics and thirteen times more used than countervailing measures. We provide next a brief look at proposals offered to reform antidumping. Table 9 provides a summary tabulation of reform proposals that have been submitted. In large part (the first two pages of the table) the proposals apply to technicalities that antidumping investigators have used to reach affirmative determinations when a common sense approach would not have. The first line in the table, for example, refers to the practice of inflating the "normal value" against which export prices are compared by throwing out instances of home market sales -but not of export sales -where the price was "below cost." Other proposals are about the details of calculating "cost" in such examinations. A group of countries who describe themselves as "Friends of Antidumping" (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey) have submitted several proposals intended to reduce the possibility for an affirmative determination. To provide another example of the nature of the proposals, one of them proposes to outlaw the practice of "zeroing." To determining if dumping has taken place and to measure the "dumping margin," antidumping investigators often have data for a number of export sales, some at high prices, some at low. Transactions with low export prices -those that show that dumping has occurred -are taken into account, but transactions with high export prices that 19 We look only at antidumping proposals. Because countervailing measures and antidumping serve different economic functions a separate examination would be necessary to evaluate proposals for countervailing measures. "Preserving the principles and the effectiveness of the instruments," for example, is more worthy of consideration would show the opposite of dumping -that is, higher export than home market prices -are discarded or "zeroed out."
Thinking within the box
The preponderance of the proposals, those in part 1 of Table 9 , reflect thinking within the box. Members who would like to see fewer antidumping measures propose to tweak the existing structure of rules in one direction, other Members prefer to hold the line. This struggle over technicalities, we contend, will have no impact on the quality of import restrictions that receive legal sanction under the antidumping agreement, little impact on the quantity.
The relevant concept from negotiating history is water in the tariff. When GATT, began tariffs were more than high enough to protect domestic suppliers -the first few rounds of negotiations had little trade impact. Though negotiations have moved tariffs from high to low, they have moved antidumping rules from simple to complex. There are today sufficient technicalities that any national authority of a mind to reach an affirmative determination can make a case. At the same time, any WTO panel will be able to find a technicality on which to discredit the national determination. In the meantime, the petitioning industry has enjoyed three years of protection.
A mathematician would say that the system is overdetermined; e.g., we have 15 equations to solve for two unknowns. Any two equations are sufficient for a solution, choosing the "right" equations provides considerable flexibility in what appears to be a technical system. Adding a few technicalities here, trimming a few there, will have no impact. The escalating cost of maneuvering within the technicalities does have the effect of disciplining use by pricing out smaller industries.
Competition policy
Shifting from antidumping to competition policy is good advice for an individual country. Competition policy's standards do a better job of identifying circumstances in which a governmental intervention in the market will serve the national economic interest. Of course, antidumping and competition policy overlap not at all, hence to shift to competition policy is to repeal of antidumping.
for countervailing measures than for antidumping.
Shifting to competition policy could be bad advice for the WTO. Winters (2002) argues convincingly that a WTO agreement on competition policy would require developing economies to adopt developed economy practices and standards. If a developed and a developing economy were acting together against a cartel, Winters reasons, the developed economy government would not want its case undermined by laxity on the part of the developing economy. Such a competition authority would be expensive, the money might have a higher development impact elsewhere.
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The national economic interest
As we explain above, the key issue in a decision to impose an import restriction should be the impact on the domestic economy. Who in the domestic economy would benefit from the proposed import restriction and who would lose? By how much?
The impact on the restriction on users/consumers should be measured in the same dimensions as the "injury test" -the impact that import competition has on the protection seeker.
Jobs lost because of higher costs, lower profits -the standard metric of "injury" applies. The technicalities are simple: recognize domestic users/consumers as "interested parties;" impose obligations to determine the impact on them that would be parallel to those already there for the "injury" investigation. Treat all affected domestic interests as equals. The nonsense of not doing so we explain in the box titled "The flawed economics of basing decisions on an injury investigation."
Several proposals (toward the bottom of Table 9 ) suggest that the "public interest" as well as the protection-seeker's interests be taken into account. The "public interest" is however treated as something ethereal, other-worldly, a socialist will-of-the-wisp that the government must represent. The relevant concept of interest, we suggest, is the sum of all the private interests affected. Only if there are "externalities" -and such are infrequently present when import protection is sought -is there an unidentified remainder that requires public representation.
Reform depends less on the good will of WTO delegates toward the "public interest" than on those business interests currently treated by trade law as bastards insisting that they be given the same standing as the law now recognizes for protection seekers. You bastards have to stand up for yourselves. Notes: a) Number of antidumping against the country group per dollar of imports from the group, scaled to figure for initiations against/ imports from all economies; e.g., industrial economies, per dollar of imports, had 1.69 times more antidumping initiations against China P.R. than against all countries.
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